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ABSTRACT
Agency theory predicts that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairman positions should be held by different
individuals in order to protect shareholder’s interest. Though there are mixed evidences on CEO duality and firm performance, most research have found that there is negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.
Although, in the last decades of the twentieth century, agency theory became the dominant force in the theoretical understanding of corporate governance, it does not however cover all aspects of corporate governance. This paper aims to
explore whether it is better to combine various theories in order to describe effective and good corporate governance or
theorizing corporate governance based on one theory only. This will cover corporate governance theories which include
agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, and institutional theory.
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Agency Theory; Stakeholder Theory; Stewardship Theory and Institutional
Theory

1. Introduction
Modern business environment is changing in haste and it
is forcing management and organizations to develop
ethical responsibility, modern and profitable businesses.
In recent decades, corporations have been found as leading and powerful institution. Corporations didn’t limit
their existence just within the developed nations rather
they extended their reach to around the world depending
on their size and capabilities. Existence of such powerful
and leading organisations influences in various aspects
such as the economies and socio cultural landscape of
country. Due to various corporate scandals around the
world including Enron, WorldCom, Marconi and Royal
Ahold (Mir and Seboui, [1]) has shaken the trust of
shareholders. Shareholders’ value is significantly affected due to these scandals. Besides this emergence of
technological era has accelerated the globalisation, which
decline the governmental control. All these situations
gave a wakeup call for greater accountability which is
one of the mechanisms of corporate governance (Abdullah and Valentine, [2]).
Therefore corporate governance has been recognised
as significant element in managing corporations in modern global phenomenon. Corporate governance includes
quite number theories. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether it is better to combine more than
agency theory in order to present a comprehensive theoCopyright © 2013 SciRes.

retical overview of good corporate governance or corporate governance based on one theory only. In this vein
theories going to be covered in this study include agency
theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and institutional theory.

2. Agency Theory
2.1. Origin of Agency Theory
Organisational theories have been developed by modern
researchers with the driving force from Adam Smith’s
“Wealth of Nations”. Adam Smith deduced that, when a
firm is controlled by a number of people or a group of
individuals rather than the owner of the firm, principal’s
(shareholder or owner) objectives are highly likely to be
diluted rather than ideally achieved. Based on Adam
Smith’s assumption regarding the ownership and control
separation in large firms, Berle and Means [3] argued
that as long as ownership gets increasingly held by people other than owners, the industry becomes consolidated
and hence the checks to limit the use of power tend to
disappear (McCrew, [4]).
However, in 1976 Jensen and Meckling [5] came up
with the concern of ownership-control separation into a
fully fledged agency problem which is comprised within
the economic theory of the firm, where costs’ of agency
problem has been identified and who bears that costs.
ME
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2.2. Definition of Agency Theory
Agency theory is based on the problems related to separation of ownership and controllability. Jensen and
Meckling [5] defined the agency problem as problem that
arises when one party (Principals) makes contract with
another party (Agents) aiming to make decisions on behalf of the principals. Jensen and Meckling [5] further
argued that when the management interest is low, there is
a greater likelihood that the management involves itself
in value decreasing activities. An agency problem occurs
as agents tend to hide information from the principals
and take actions in order to achieve their own interest
(Enron, WorldCom, Marconi and Royal Ahold).
An agency problem comes into play when the CEO
sets some goals which contradict of those shareholders.
This problem occurs when the CEO has little or no interest in the outcome of his decisions (Jensen and Meckling,
[5]; Fama and Jensen, [6]). Boyd [7] asserts that the CEO
is likely to implement such a strategy that will maximise
his or her personal interest at the expense of shareholders’ while at little or no risk to him or her.
Craig [8] deduced that agency relationship refers to
many relationships involved in the delegation of decision
making from one party (Principal) to another party
(Agent). This definition considers that shareholding persuades delegation of managerial responsibility from
firm’s principals to their upper ranked agents. Delegation
and various risks cause a moral hazard to the executives.
Jensen [9] asserts that such moral hazard to executives
gives opportunity to seek for additional compensation
through opportunistic means such as perquisites, shirking
and free-riding and at the same time the principals are
motivated to increase their monitoring fees and incentives.
Jensen and Meckling [5] defined the agency costs as
the inevitable loss of firm value that arises with the
agency problems along with the costs of contractual
monitoring and bonding. Watts and Zimmerman [10]
developed Positive Accounting theory which focuses on
the relationship between various individuals involved in
providing resources to an organisation. This could be the
relationship between the owners (as suppliers of equity
capital) and the managers (as suppliers of managerial
labour). PAT assumes that self interest is driven by individual actions. Or in other words, principal and agent are
fully wary in maximizing their own wealth. It is assumed
that agency theory believes that the agents (management)
are not always likely to act in the best interest of the
owners (principals). Such assumption requires the principals to consider appropriate incentives or bonus scheme
for the agent and at the same time set up proper monitoring mechanism so that any unusual activities can be controlled. Three types of costs have been identified by Jensen and Meckling [5] due to agency problem, namely:
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
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 Monitoring costs
 Bonding costs
 Residual loss

2.3. Monitoring Costs
Craig [8] argues that assuming managers (agents) will be
responsible for preparing the financial statements, there
will be attempt to overstate profits thereby increasing the
ultimate share of incentives or bonus as their (agent) actions are self interest driven. On the other hand Jensen
and Meckling [5] deduce that principal and agent are
concerned in maximizing their own interest or wealth,
while agents (decision makers) may not take actions in
the best interest of the owners (principals). Therefore
both Jensen and Meckling [5] and Craig [8] presume that
the principal has to monitor the agents by setting up
monitoring mechanisms which could be in the form of
hiring external auditors who will audit the financial reports. The cost of undertaking an audit is referred to as
monitoring costs. In fact Jensen and Meckling [5] argued
that monitoring is a comprehensive term as it contains
controls and does not merely observe and measure manager’s performance but rather sets budget restrictions and
operating rules.

2.4. Bonding Costs
As agents are concerned on maximizing their own wealth,
a mechanism can be established that will align the interest of the managers (agent) of the firm with those of the
owners (shareholder) (Henderson et al. [11]). Mechanisms of aligning interest may include providing the
manager with profit share of the firm based on accounting outcome or performance. Such accounting based
alignment highly requires producing financial statements
(Craig, [8]). Managers are required to bond themselves to
prepare these financial statements which are costly and
referred to as bonding cost. However, Jensen and Meckling [5] argued that agents may take action by spending
resources in assuring that it would not take actions which
would not have negative effect on the principal, which is
considered as bonding costs. For instance, bond provided
by the agent.

2.5. Residual Loss
However, though the monitoring and bonding costs are
incurred, there may still be lose to the principals provided that the agents make decisions that are different
from those that could maximize principals’ interest (Williamson, [12]). This lose is recognised as residual loss. In
general, monitoring and bonding costs are incurred in
order to minimize or reduce the agency problem. However, unlike the assumption of self interest that individuals
take that aim to benefit the principal there will be no
ME

A. AL MAMUN

need to take such initiatives. Craig [8] argues that not all
the actions of agents can be controlled by monitoring or
contractual arrangements or otherwise, there will always
be some residual costs associated with appointing agents.
Williamson [12] argues that principals might seek to
minimize residual cost, since it is considered as key cost.
In addition dilution is very common in corporations.
When owner of a firm sells a portion of the equity firm’s
to others, dilution of ownership occurs and this situation
separates the ownership and control. Dilution can happen
for various reasons, for instance to attain better efficacy
by distributing some portions of ownership rights. Usually the old principal holds with the controlling power
rather than the new principal. In this vein, the old princepal operates the firm as agent aiming to protect new
principals’ interest.
In this situation new principal may feel that the decision made by the older owner or agent requires to be
monitored, in expectation of divergence of interests. Here,
the new principal may tend to deduct likely monitoring
costs from the price payable to the old principal for buying shares. Such a payment strategy decreases old principal’s wealth. Moreover, old principal (agent) may require making bond in order to provide assurance to the
new principal. And bonding cost will be borne by the old
principal. In order to ensure that the agency costs are at
the minimum level, old principal bears all the costs from
the separation of ownership and control.
In some circumstances, owners of the firm may decide
to dispense with the entire ownership. Jensen and Meckling [5] deduce that the degree to which owner may dispense or dilute the ownership status is based on factors
which could include sum of monitoring and bonding
costs allied to the separation of ownership and control in
relation to controlling wholly owned over partially
owned resources.
There are mixed evidence in respect of this prediction
of agency theory. The board member responsible for the
executive management is called the managing director or
chief executive officer. When chairman is also performing the role of CEO, that refers to CEO duality. CEO is
responsible for the running of board as well as operating
the firm. Such duality is found in a number of countries
such as Australia, and the United States. Donalson and
Davis [13] argue that a small portion of firms in Australia have CEO duality, while 80 percent of companies in
the United States have CEOs who also hold the position

39

ET AL.

of chairman (Kesner and Dalton, [14]). Various studies
found that in combining of these two roles individual
become so much powerful, as it ought not to be (Ahmed,
[15]; Davis, [16]; Rechner and Dalton, [17]). However,
subsequently the dual leadership has dropped from 80
percent to 60 percent by 2003, which is shown in the
Table 1 below.
When CEO also holds the position of board chair, the
role of the board as monitoring and control mechanism is
compromised. According to the agency theory while the
CEO is also the board chair, it weakens board monitoring
and control and in this situation it is likely that shareholders’ interests will be sacrificed at a degree in favour
of management. Their opportunistic activities could result in higher levels of executive compensation (Levy,
[19]; Dayton, [20]).
Consequently, an agency problem exists when the
CEO has established goals that are at variance with those
of shareholders. Such problem is more likely to occur
when the CEO has little or no financial interest in the
outcome of his decisions (Jensen and Meckling, [5];
Fama and Jensen, [6]).

2.6. Views on Agency Theory
There are several findings which validate agency theory
from different contexts. These Studies include Denis and
Serin, [21]; Kehoe, [22]; Krishnan and Loch, [23] who
pursued their research on public offer of new capital or
initial public offering (IPO), set up of franchisee and
labour union transactions respectively.
Denis and Serin [21] in particular, argue that managers
in firm incorporate diversifications because their private
benefits related with diversified portfolio (pecuniary
which is incentives and non-pecuniary such as power,
Jensen and Meckling, [5]). This suggests that diversification can lead to value reduction as firm trades at a discount as against their single segment peers. Franchisee
set up is efficient in mitigating agency problems (Kehoe,
[22]). This is because franchisee compensates from the
residual claims of their individual units. Hence, they bear
the cost proportionately based on the units owned. On the
other hand, Jensen and Meckling [5] argue that in the
context of Anglo-American corporate governance system
is an agency relationship that agents will not act to
maximise the returns of principals unless corporate governance mechanisms are set to minimize the divergence of

Table 1. Dual leadership in USA.
Year

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Avg

61.88

60.23

62.56

Distribution of the duality
Number of firms with dual CEOs

65.49

63.45

61.74

Source: Chia et al. [18].

Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
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interests between shareholders and managers or in other
words principal and agents.
Finally it can be posited that agency theory is a significant proposition in firm discipline. The theory assumes that when ownership and control is separated in a
firm, the CEO, and manager act as agent on behalf of
the principal (makes decisions) tends to bringing moral
hazards by seizing wealth which happens at the expense
of owner. Therefore, it is suggested that the owner set up
corporate governance mechanisms that will deter the
CEO, managers (agent) from such behaviour. Mechanisms could be various incentive plans including share
issue, options and share of profit. These incentives are
either monitoring by principal or bonding by agent. In
Figure 1, agency theory mentioned in the following figure.

2.7. Corporate Governance Responses to Agency
Problem
Jensen and Meckling [5] found that the important role of
monitoring in agency relationships that authority does
not scan further the way how large firms attain efficient
monitoring or the way firms construct corporate governance aiming to control the agency costs created due to
the separation of control and ownership. However, efficient control of agency problem in large firms is pursued
by establishment of internal devices in response to competitor firms or competition from other firms (Fama,
[25]). Fama [5] further argues that individual managers
within the firm are controlled by the discipline of market
and opportunities for their services both within and outside the firm.
Fama and Jensen [6] argue that firms segregate decision making process and decision control both at top
level and lower level of the firm hierarchy, where top
level refers to the board and managers and lower level
refers to the managers and workers. Here, decision ma-

ET AL.

nagement is explained as carrying out a firm’s function
and decision control is explained as overseeing the performance of the decision management function.
Fama and Jensen [6] argue that the reason behind contrasting decision management and decision control is to
avoid situations where agent without ownership of firm
may intend to maximize own wealth by decisions which
may not be for the best interest of the principal. Board of
directors are appointed by the principals as response of
corporate governance to minimize or control the agency
problem which arises with senior managers including the
CEO. Board of directors have the authority of decision
control whilst authority of decision management rights is
vested in the senior managers. Ahmed [15] suggests that
shareholder and CEO relationship will inevitably become
problematic as managerial actions depart from those required by shareholders to maximise their own interest
and shareholders seek to prevent CEO from maximising
their wealth. In this vein, corporate governance is concerned with the constraints that are applied to minimise
the opportunistic activities of the CEO, hence, reduce the
agency problem.
In a similar vein, management control system is also
designed with the expectation that managers oversee the
tasks carried out by the lower level managers and workers. Stettler [26] argues that the operational and accounting duties be separated. There is no conflict of interest as
the resources held by the principal in such situation resulted from the segregation of decision management and
decision control, while decision maker is also the principal.

3. Stakeholder Theory
In recent years, the concept of stakeholder has achieved
widespread popularity among academics, the media and
corporate managers. Now the question that rises is: what
is stakeholder theory? There are different definitions given

Lubatkin et al. [24].

Figure 1. Agency theory’s view of principal agent relationship.
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
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on stakeholder theory by different scholars. Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) defined stakeholder theory in
1963 as “those groups without whose support the organisation would cease to exist”. This definition was
modified by Freeman [27] who defined stakeholder theory as those groups who are vital to the survival and success of the organisation. It is obvious that the definition
given is organisation oriented. However, in earlier researcher stakeholder was defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement
of the organisation objectives” (Freeman, [28]). Friedman [29] however argued that the definition given by
Freeman [28] is more balanced and takes wider area than
the definition given by SRI (1963) this is because it includes individuals outside the firm and that groups may
consider themselves to be stakeholders of an organisation
without the firm considering them to be such. In addition,
Gray, Owen and Adams [30] stated that stakeholders are
identified by the organisation of concern, by reference to
the extent to which the organisation believes the interplay with each group needs to be managed in order to
further the interests of the organisation. Conventionally,
interest of the organisation is nothing but profit seeking
assumption. In Freeman’s definitional perspective, the
organisation is seen as part of a larger social system.
Stakeholders would include shareholders, employees,
customers, lenders, suppliers, local charities, various
interest groups and governments.
Similarly, in Figure 2, Craig [8] asserted that the view
of stakeholder theory is that all the stakeholders have
right to be provided with information about how the organisation is affecting them (perhaps through pollution,
community sponsorship, provision of employment, safety
initiatives, etc.), even if they choose not to use the information and even if they cannot directly affect the survival of the organisation. Figure 1 depicts the inter relationship between various stakeholders. Such practice will

ET AL.

41

increase the transparency of organisational activities and
performance. Therefore, it can be said that stakeholder
theory can assist firms to achieve one of the corporate
governance mechanisms, which is transparency, while
according to the Gray, Owen and Adams [30] practicing
stakeholder theory helps organisation to achieve the organisational goals which include increasing profitability.
Ullmann [31] argues that the greater the importance to
the organisation of the stakeholder’s resources/support,
the greater the probability that a particular stakeholder’s
expectations will be accommodated within the organisation’s operations. This perspective includes various activities such as public reporting. Moreover, organisations
will have an incentive to disclose information about their
various programs and initiatives to the stakeholder
groups concerned to clearly indicate that they are conforming to those stakeholders’ expectations, as organisations must necessarily balance the expectations of various stakeholder groups.
Within the same line of thought, Roberts (p. 598) [32]
argued that stakeholder related activities are useful in
developing and maintaining satisfactory relationships
with stockholders, creditors and other related parties.
Developing a corporate reputation through performing
and disclosing necessary reports activities is part of a
strategy for managing stakeholder relationships. Disclosing necessary reporting to the shareholders is the
duty of management and proper disclosure can build
good relationship between owners and managers while at
the same time reducing agency problem. However,
stakeholder theory does not directly provide prescriptions
about what information should be disclosed (Craig, [8])
other than indicating that the provision of information,
including information within an annual report can, if
thoughtfully considered, be useful for the continued operations of a business entity.
Quite a number of companies have developed and run

Source: Craig [8].

Figure 2. Stakeholder theory.
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
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their business in terms highly consistent with stakeholder
theory. These firms include JandJ, eBay, Google, Lincoln
Electric, AES featured in Built to last and Good to Great
(Collins, [33]; Collins and Porras, [34]) continued to
provide compelling examples of how managers understand the core insights of stakeholder theory and use
them to create outstanding business. Freeman et al. [35]
asserted that the concept of stakeholder theory can vary
from individuals to individuals, as it does not follow that
we should cast it as everything non-shareholder oriented.
Here it is significant to remember that shareholders are
one of the stakeholders. Freeman [27] argues that segregating shareholder for instance from stakeholder concept
is nothing but contrasting apples with fruit. Shareholders
are one of the stakeholders and it does not get us anywhere to try to contrast the two. Therefore, stakeholder
theory can help firms to achieve organisational goals
resulting from satisfying shareholders. Freeman et al. [27]
further argued that stakeholder theory gives managers
more resources and a greater capability to deal with
companies’ internal problem.
Freeman et al. [27] concluded that creating value for
stakeholders creates value for shareholders. In supporting
stakeholder view, Etzioni [36] concludes that the moral
legitimacy of the claim that shareholders have certain
rights and entitlements as shareholders sink their capital,
but Etzioni [36] maintains that “the same basic claim
should be extended to all those who invest in the corporation”. This includes: employees (especially those who
worked for a corporation for many years and loyally); the
community (to the extent special investments are made
that specifically benefit that corporation); creditors (especially large, long-term ones); and, under some conditions, clients.
However Goodpaster [37] criticises that a multi-fiduciary stakeholder approach has failed to recognize that
the relationship between management and stockholders is
ethically different in kind from the relationship between
management and other parties (like employees, suppliers,
customers, etc.). Goodpaster [37] further argues that
though managers have many non-fiduciary duties to
various stakeholder groups, their fiduciary duties are
only to shareholders.

4. Stewardship Theory
According to scholars, though agency theory has its origin in economics, stewardship theory has evolved from
psychology and sociology. Stewardship theory grew out
of the seminal work by Donaldson and Davis [38] and
was developed as a model where senior executives act as
stewards for the organization and in the best interests of
the principals. The model given by Donaldson and Davis
[38] asserts that managers will make decisions and act in
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
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the best interest of the firm, putting collectivist options
above self-serving options. Notably, stewards are motivated only by making the right decisions which are in the
best interest of the organisation, as there is strong assumption that stewards will benefit, if the firm is prospered. At the same time, stewardship theory presumes
that executives and managers’ main duty is maximizing
firm performance, while working under the premise as so;
both principal and stewards can be benefited from the
performance of the organisation.
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson [39] defined stewardship theory as “a steward protects and maximises shareholders wealth through firm performance, because by
doing so, the steward’s utility functions are maximized”.
In this definition, the writers identified firm executives
and managers as the stewards working for the principal.
Later, Block [40] suggested the stewardship role as “service over self-interest” believing that both organizational
and individual needs will be achieved at the best by
honouring relationships and treating followers like
“owners and partners”. In extension of stewardship theory definition, Caldwell and Karri [41] posited that there
are covenantal duties owed to all stakeholders that acknowledged the importance of a systemic fit of organization governance with the conditions of its environment.
However, stewardship can simply be defined as a behaviour that places the long term interest of the organisation as well as the shareholders a head of individuals’
self-interest. Company executives and managers are
aimed to protect and make profits for the principals
(shareholders), while in agency theory, firm executives
and managers aim to work for their self interest. On the
other hand, Donaldson and Daivis, [38] argued that
stewardship theory ignores individualism, rather firm
executives and managers play their role as stewards by
aligning their interest along with the organisation goals.
According to the Figure 3, in fact, stewardship concept
suggests that successful organisation leads to happiness
and hence motivate stewards, not individual success or
goals attained (Abdullah and Valentine, [2]).
Unlike agency theory, the principal espouses stewardship theory which empowers managers and executives
with the information and the equipment and the power
believing that they will make decisions in the best interest of the organisation and for the principals. It enables
the decision makers to act on behalf of the firm and for
the firm, having faith that they will maximise the long
term return of the firm. Argyris [42] noted that placing
control structure or monitoring on executives or managers ultimately discourages them and will result in unproductive outcomes for the organisation as well as principals and stewards. Stewardship theory believes in acting in the best interest of the organisation, unlike agency
theory, therefore it argues that any control or monitoring
ME
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Source: Abdullah and Valentine [2].

Figure 3. Stewardship theory model.

structure may de-motivate decision makers, which may
have negative impact on firm performance.
However, in order not to place the full authority to the
stewards without any control and monitoring structures,
principals are required to get rid of the typical assumptions which are the result of agency theory. Principals are
required to build the requisite trusting relationship with
executives and managers. Placing the authority can help
the stewards to make decisions independently for best
interest of the organisation. Though agency theory talks
about focusing on controlling cost and minimizing
downside, stewardship theory focuses on maximizing the
upside of the relationship (Donaldson and Davis, [38]).
While working on high-commitment organisations,
Walton [43] found there is consistency between the dimensions of open communications and empowerment.
Later the same findings empirically tested by Davis,
Schoorman and Donaldson [39] where research found a
series of factors which describe the management philosophy of stewardship, those series of factors include
trust, open communication, empowerment, long-term
orientation and performance enhancement. Stewardship
theory is the combination of all these factors. Trust dimension is significant in building relationships between
stewards and principals, so that principals can place the
authority to executives and managers to get the works
done in the best interest of organisations.
However, as decision makers, executives and managers have to maintain their reputation to lead the firm in
such a way that it maximizes the profitability resulting in
maximum returns to the principals invested capital (Daily
et. al. [44]). Here individual performance is impacted by
the firm’s performance. Therefore, executives and managers are managing and working for the firms having inCopyright © 2013 SciRes.

tention to be seen as effective stewards in the organisation (Fama, [5]). For example, Abdullah and Valentine [2]
argued that stewardship model can be better linked to
Japan, as employees in Japan take the role of stewards
and ownership diligently. On the other hand, Shleifer and
Vishny [45] proposed that managers and executives return finance to investors to establish a good reputation so
that that they can re-enter the market for future finance.
From stewardship theory perspective unifying the
CEO and chairman role is effective as this can reduce
agency costs resulting in a great role of stewards in the
organisation. Abdullah and Valentine [2] suggested that
such stewardship can help to safeguard the interest of the
principals (shareholders). Donaldson and Davis [2] proposed that combining both theories can bring improvements in the returns in organisations than when separated
and this was empirically tested. Furthermore, stewardship theory identifies the significance of structures that
empower firm executives and directors who are offered
maximum autonomy to build on trust (Donaldson and
Davis, [38]). It emphasises for managers and directors to
act more as an individual to maximize the firm’s profitability resulting in the maximization of shareholder’s return on invested capital. Wealth creation is a variable
sum opportunity that is synergistic and practical. Hosmer
[46] argued that the manager’s role is to maximize the
potential of the organization to pursue long-term wealth
creation with organizational and individual goals best
achieved by pursuing collective ends. Peggy and Hugh
[47] argued that unlike agency theory, stewardship theory helps in aligning the goals of managers and shareholders. When managers and shareholders’ goals are
aligned, firm performance is expected to increase as there
is no conflict of self-interest.
ME
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5. Institutional Theory
Coase [48] proposed that institutions were created by
human beings to decrease the uncertainties of transactions between economic agents, where a major part of
those uncertainties are due to opportunistic human behaviour (Williamson, [49]). Williamson [49] further argued that without institutions and markets firms may
have never existed and transactions could have never
begun. Traditional definition of institutions are found as
what we regard or do not regard as acceptable and thus
determine the framework in which any action finds its
legitimacy. Suchman [50] argued that an organisation
cannot survive without legitimacy: an approval of its
general environment that its actions are desirable, suitable and are adapted, with the interior of the standards,
values and beliefs system, socially built. Later in 2005,
Krishna and Das [51] made similar conclusion, where
they posited that, institutional perspective assumes that
the environment recognises and empowers institutions to
award firms, or withhold from firms, resources such as
legitimacy. The tenets of institutional theory are also best
met in a business environment with high level of regulation.
Institutional theory argues that organisations are not
just a place where goods and services are produced rather
these are also social and cultural systems. In other words,
firms not only engage themselves in competition but legitimised themselves also. A major paper in the development of institutional theory was by DiMaggio and Powell
[52] who defined an institutional field as those organisations that in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of
institutional life: key suppliers, resources, regulatory
agencies, and other organisations that produce similar
products and services.
DiMaggio and Powell [52] viewed the process by
which organisations tend to adopt the same structures
and practice “isomorphism”. Isomorphism is a process
that causes one unit in a population to resemble other
units in the population that face the same set of environmental conditions. DiMaggio and Powell [52] found
three different isomorphism processes namely coercive,
mimetic and normative isomorphism.
Coercive isomorphism arises when organisations
change their institutional practices in response to pressure from stakeholders upon whom the organisation is
dependent. Company is coerced into adapting its existing
voluntary corporate reporting practices, where stakeholders are taken into consideration. Once the voluntary
corporate reporting is adopted, stakeholders are pleased
with the organisation. Such practice will help the organisation to be competitive on the market resulting positive
firm performance.
Institutional theory pressures to meet certain standards
of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, [45]),
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
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which is linked to firm performance. Krishna and Das
[51] argued that institutional perspectives on corporate
governance are best met in an environment with high
levels of regulatory efficiency. This finding is similar to
Kathleen [53] where it mentioned that organisations are
the way they are for no other reason than that the way
they are is the legitimate way to organise. The key concept of this idea is that organisational actions evolve over
time and become legitimated within an organisation and
an environment.
Seal [54] asserted that the significance of institution
theory is the openness about human behaviour and organisational practices. This theory also offers the way,
how to link the institutionally informed management
accounting research that has been increasingly adopted at
the organisational level to the wider political, legal and
social processes associated with corporate governance
and professionalization.
Kathleen [53] made a comparison between agency
theory and institutional theory depicted in Table 2 below.
In this business sustainability journal we have discover
the reality of different approach that exists in effective
corporate governing. No one theory can give us the best
performance result but a combination of all can deliver
the business need and keep the organization running
while balancing the principal and the manager rights over
the business. In Figure 4, we have seen how this has
over lapping effect on the other three theories, Like, the
institutional theory states that firms not only engage
themselves in competition but legitimised themselves.
On the other hand, Stewardship theory is defined as
“stewards protect and maximise shareholders wealth
through firm performance. By doing so, the steward’s
utility functions are maximized”. Hence the link is clear
how institutional theory is a subset of stewardship theory.
Agency theory is based on the problems related to
separation of ownership and controllability. In Freeman’s
definitional perspective, the organisation is seen as part
of a larger social system. Stakeholders would include
shareholders, employees, customers, lenders, suppliers,
local charities, various interest groups and governments.
So we can see how various stakeholders if left to make
decision alone can open up sever loophole in principal
wealth protection. Therefore, in order to strengthen corporation effectiveness we need to emphasise in all of
them. As agency theory dictate that the greater likelihood
that the management involves itself in value decreasing
activities. An agency problem occurs as agents tend to
hide information from the principals and take actions in
order to achieve their own interest (Enron, WorldCom,
Marconi and Royal Ahold). With the above theory we
can see how stakeholder theory proves agency theory
about each component of an organization take action
ME
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Table 2. Comparison between agency theory and institutional theory.
Agency theory
Key idea
Basis of organisation
View of people
Role of environment
Role of technology
Problem domain
Independent variables outc

Assumptions

Institutional theory

Organisational practices arise from efficient organisation of
information and risk breaking costs

Organisational practices arise from imitative
and firm traditions

Efficiency

Legitimacy

Self-interested rationalists

Legitimacy-seeking satisfiers

Organisational practices should fit environment

A source of practices to which organisation
conforms

Organisational practices should fit technology employed

Technology moderates the impact of institutional
factors or can be determined institutionally

Control problems (vertical integration, compensation, regulation)

Organisational practices, in general

Outcome uncertainty, span of control, programmability

Industry traditions, legislation, social and
political beliefs, founding conditions that
comprise the institutional

People are self-employed
People are rational
People are risk-averse

People satisfied
People conform to external norms

Agency Theory

Institutional
Theory

Effective corporate
governance

Stakeholder
theory

Stewardship
Theory

Figure 4. Analyse the theories.

according to their own benefit.
Now if we look at the Institutional theory and agency
theory, these two theories have distinct differences. One
emphasises on the Management ethics and the other talks
about the formation of social culture of organization life.
As the organization continues to exist, it also develops a
unique personality in which agency theory comes in and
ultimately the principal might lose control and proving
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.

agency theory.

6. Discussion and Conclusions
Though there are a number of theories related to corporate governance, the evolution of agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and institutional theory
explain the CEO/chairman duality, audit committee and
the role of management most. These four theories are
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considered as the fundamental theories of corporate governance. In considering the stakeholder theory and institutional theory, it can be deduced that corporate governance is more towards social relationships rather than
structure. All the four theories discussed above mostly on
the perception that principals get return on their investment in the firm. The various models of corporate governance that exist globally have evolved as economies
and the corporate structure were shaped, simply following convention, or based on environmental influences
such as worldview, culture, and the legislative and political framework. Due to abrupt changes in external and
internal business environment, corporate governance also
changes constantly. External environmental factors include business collaborations, financial funding, new
business venture, technological advancements, mergers
and acquisitions, while internal environmental factors
include shareholders, stakeholders and profit maximization of the firm. All these environmental factors result in
changes directly or indirectly to corporate governance.
Corporate governance mechanisms may differ from
country to country based on economic positions, political
and cultural situations.
Hofstede and Hofstede [55] argued that the relevance
and applicability of theories vary between developed and
developing market. As the institutional and organisational framework is weak in the developing market, it
can be posited that agency theory more likely to be applied in depicting the organisational behaviour and business management principles in developed market. It is
contended, from agency theory perspective, that the
delegation of executive and managerial responsibilities
by principles to agents demands the presence of mechanisms that tends to align the interest of corporate population or ensures that agents (executives and managers)
exercise their authority in order to generate the uppermost return for the owners. Purpose of this study was to
explore theories of corporate governance in a broad
range which would cover all the aspects of corporate
governance rather than a partial context (which is principles and agents relationship covered by agency theory).
Freeman et al. [27] argued that stakeholder theory better
equips managers to articulate and foster the shared purpose of their firm. This theory acknowledges a wide
range of answers rather than only principles and agents.
Stakeholder theory posits that firm is not only to generate
profit for the shareholders but to defend an image and
values respecting all shareholders.
As mentioned earlier that agency theory does not
cover corporate governance fully, combining the agency,
stakeholder, stewardship and institutional theories disclose the differing authorities of different types of shareholders within the developing market firms. These theories largely, point out that there is a positive reinforcing
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
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effect on firm performance. In reality, contributions of
different theories at corporate governance level establish
a foundation which redefines the various stakes of the
firm and the model of corporate governance.
In addition, this paper suggests that effective corporate
governance could not be illustrated by one theory rather
it needs a combination of more than one. Therefore,
agency theory can cover the management and principals,
while stakeholder theory can address the social relationships and institutional theory can cover the rules and
regulations and enforcement of those.
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